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Public providers have no financial incentive to respect their legal obligation to exempt the poor from user 
fees. Health Equity Funds (HEFs) aim to make exemptions effective by giving NGOs responsibility for 
assessing eligibility and compensating providers for lost revenue. We use the geographic spread of HEFs 
in Cambodia to identify their impact on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. Among households with some 
OOP payment, HEFs reduce the amount by 29%, on average. The effect is larger for households that are 
poorer, mainly use public health care and live closer to a district hospital. HEFs are more effective in 
reducing OOP payments when they are operated by a NGO, rather than the government, and when they 
operate in conjunction with the contracting of public health services. HEFs reduce households’ health-
related debt by around 25%, on average. There is no significant impact on non-medical consumption and 
health care utilisation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
De jure, the poor are often exempt from user fees levied at public health facilities in low income countries. 
De facto, exemptions are seldom respected. The primary reason is that providers are charged with 
responsibility for establishing exemption eligibility but are not compensated for revenue lost from 
exemptions granted. The incentives to be vigilant in honouring legal rights to fee waivers are not strong. 
They are further weakened by the often vague criteria for eligibility status and the heavy reliance of health 
facilities on user fee revenue not only to finance supplies but also to provide incomes to staff whose low 
salaries may be paid intermittently (Creese, 1991; Gilson et al., 1995; Russell and Gilson, 1997). As a 
consequence, poor households are left exposed to out-of-pocket (OOP) health payments that threaten to 
drive them further into poverty. They may opt for unqualified, but ostensibly cheap, providers of health 
care and for self-medication, or even forgo treatment altogether. 
Making exemptions effective would appear to require both separation of responsibility for assessment of 
exemption eligibility from that of provision of care and compensation of providers for lost fee revenue. 
Health Equity Funds (HEFs), which have been operating in Cambodia since 2000 and have a lesser 
presence in Lao and Vietnam, are based on this logic. They are mostly financed by international donors 
and operated by local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), which have responsibility for selecting 
patients whose fees at selected public health facilities are paid from the fund. Besides having their fees 
paid, HEF beneficiaries may also be reimbursed for their transport and food costs. 
This subsidy model has spread rapidly in Cambodia over the last decade. Three-quarters of the population 
is now resident in areas in which HEFs operate and the government is pursuing a target of nationwide 
coverage by 2013. HEFs are expanding not only geographically but also from coverage of district 
hospitals to include health centres. They are the most likely mechanism to implement a recently 
announced government policy of tax financed care for the poor at public facilities. For Cambodia, as well 
as other low income countries wrestling with the problem of financing public health services while 
shielding poor patients from prohibitive user fees, it is imperative to establish whether HEFs are 
succeeding in their primary objective of offering financial protection to poor households and their 
secondary one of improving access to qualified providers. The existing literature generally argues that 
HEFs fulfil their promise (Annear, 2010). This conclusion is largely based on small scale studies, which, 
while providing valuable detail on the operation of HEFs, make only descriptive comparisons between 
areas with and without a HEF, or of a single area before and after the introduction of a HEF. There has 
been no country-wide evaluation with a design sufficient to identify the impact of HEFs on health care 
payments and utilisation.  
The effectiveness of HEFs in financially protecting the poor from health care costs cannot be taken as 
given. The model may fail to meet its objectives for a number of reasons. First, targeting of the poor 
could be weak. All methods that have been employed by HEFs to identify the poor give voice to the 
community and much latitude in the definition of poverty. While in many respects laudable, this could be 
exploited to direct subsidies toward acquaintances and cronies. Second, initially most HEFs established 
eligibility only when someone presented at the hospital for treatment – so-called ‘post-identification’. 
Many poor may have been unaware that they would be granted exemption from fees. Third, most people 
in Cambodia do not immediately resort to public health care when sick. Distance to the district hospital 
and the often unreliable service on offer there, and not only the cost, discourage usage and encourage 
substitution with medicines purchased from usually unqualified, but convenient, local vendors. Waiving 
fees may not be sufficient to overcome the other deterrents to utilisation of public health care. Fourth, 
providers may attempt to charge illegally and still claim fees from the HEF. Finally, the NGO itself is 
usually paid in relation to inputs and estimated workload but compensates facilities on a fee per case 
3  
basis. To an extent, the disincentive to encourage utilisation by the exempted poor is shifted backward 
from the providers to the HEF operator.  
This paper exploits the geographic spread of HEFs over the last decade to compare changes in outcomes 
in areas that acquire a HEF with changes in outcomes in areas that remain without a HEF. We implement 
this difference-in-differences (DID) identification strategy using household data from four nationally 
representative cross-sectional surveys conducted between 2004 and 2009. Effects on OOP payments for 
health care, health-related debt, non-medical consumption and health care utilisation are estimated. 
We find that HEFs do not reduce the propensity to incur health care payments, which is anticipated since 
HEFs mainly cover inpatient care at the district hospital and will not eliminate all health care expenses, 
particularly those on self-medication and private sector care. But HEFs do reduce the amount spent on 
health care by a substantial 29% averaged over all households making some payment. The effect is larger 
for the poorer households (35%) that HEFs are intended to target. It is also larger for households that 
mainly rely on public health care (43%), which is what HEFs cover, and for those that live within 5km of 
a district hospital (46%), which is where HEFs are typically located. While NGO operated HEFs reduce 
OOP payments, we find that this is not the case in areas where fee exemptions are funded by the 
government and compensation of providers is paid through the public administration. This is important 
since consideration is currently being given to a policy of tax financed health care for the poor 
implemented through expansion of the government subsidy scheme. HEFs have a larger impact on OOP 
payments when they operate in conjunction with performance-based contracting of public health services. 
We also examine whether contracting itself impacts on OOP payments and find a negative effect only 
when accompanied by a HEF. But the impact of contracting is larger on the non-poor than it is on the 
poor. 
The average payment for a hospitalisation in Cambodia has been estimated as equivalent to more than 40 
times the daily earnings of a field labourer (Hardeman et al., 2004). Such costs can only be met through 
resorting to borrowing and other coping strategies. We find that HEFs reduce health-related debt by an 
average of 25% among households that incur such debt. There is no significant impact on non-medical 
consumption. This suggests that in the absence of the HEF subsidy, beneficiaries mainly finance health 
care through borrowing, and possibly other coping strategies. There is also no evidence of any impact on 
health care utilisation although this may be attributable to limitations of the health care data available.  
In the next section we provide some background on health care financing and the operation of HEFs in 
Cambodia. In the third section we sketch our identification strategy and describe the data. The models 
and estimators are set out in section four. Results are presented in section five. The final section 
concludes with implications for the financing of health care in Cambodia and further afield. 
2. HEALTH FINANCING AND HEFS IN CAMBODIA 
2.1 HEALTH FINANCING  
Cambodia, which has a population of a little less than 15 million, is one of the poorest countries in south-
east Asia, with GDP per capita of only $1915 at purchasing power parity exchange rates (PPP) in 2009 
(US$706), and 28% of the population living on less than $1.25 per day in 2007 (World Bank, 2011). Total 
expenditure on health per capita is low in absolute terms at only $122 (PPP) in 2009, but at 6% of GDP is 
the highest relative spending of any ASEAN country except Vietnam (World Health Organization, 
2011b). Over 70% of health expenditure is financed from OOP payments (ibid), which are mainly for self-
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medication and private sector care. Around two-thirds of the remainder is estimated to be financed by 
government, and the rest from external resources.  
Utilisation of curative, but not preventive, public health services is low (World Health Organization, 
2011a). This reflects perceived low quality of care and unreliability of service provision. Combined with 
often long distances to public health facilities and cultural preferences for care at home and traditional 
healers, there is a strong bias toward private sector, often unqualified, providers and self-medication 
(Annear et al., 2006). This bias is maintained and encouraged by low paid public sector staff moonlighting 
in the private sector. 
Public health facilities are financed through a combination of government funding of salaries, drug 
supplies and recurrent costs, direct subsidies from international donors and user fees paid by patients and 
HEFs, as well as some payments through voucher schemes and community based health insurance. The 
right to charge user fees was established by the 1996 National Health Financing Charter. The objective 
was to provide revenue for the operation of hitherto poorly resourced facilities and to motivate staff paid 
very low salaries (Jacobs and Price, 2004). All but 1% of user fee revenue is retained by the facility; 60% 
can be used to provide staff incentives and 39% to supplement operational budgets (Ministry of Health, 
2009a). Fees can only be charged after approval by both a local committee, including elected community 
representatives, and the Ministry of Health (MoH) (Jacobs and Price, 2004). MoH approval is conditional 
on establishing a system of exemptions of the poor, or rather the poorest.  
The opportunity to charge fees is taken up by almost all public health facilities. Fees are estimated to 
generate around 30% of public health facility revenue (Annear et al., 2006). Case studies claim that user 
fees substituted for informal payments, reduced price uncertainty by replacing opaque under-the-table 
payments with a published price schedule, possibly even reduced costs to patients, raised hospital revenue 
and, consequently, service quality and utilisation (Akashi et al., 2004; Annear et al., 2006; Barber et al., 
2004; Jacobs and Price, 2004). But there is also a widespread belief that exemption schemes were 
ineffective, in large part because providers were not compensated for the lost revenue. Around 10% of 
revenue is estimated to be lost due to the fee exemptions that are actually granted (Annear et al., 2006). In 
the years immediately following the introduction of user fees, the average proportion exempted was 
around half the official poverty rate (Annear et al., 2006). Official exemption schemes are designed at the 
Operational District (OD) level within the health system, resulting in a great deal of geographic variation 
in exemption rates, as well as means testing rules.  
Case studies suggest that, prior to the introduction of HEFs, fees deterred utilisation by the poor (Jacobs 
and Price, 2004) and that OOP payments were a major cause of impoverishment and indebtedness (Van 
Damme et al., 2004). 
2.2 HEALTH EQUITY FUNDS  
The HEF model recognises the importance of user fees in providing resources and incentives to public 
health facilities, but also in leaving poor households exposed to health care costs. By funding fee waivers 
HEFs not only support demand for public health care, they also provide incentives for suppliers to 
respect exemption entitlements. Providers are usually paid a fixed amount per case, which is very broadly 
defined. Autonomous at the OD level, HEFs have spread rapidly from operating in only 2 of 77 ODs in 
2000 to 61 by 2010. Financed mostly by international donors, HEFs basically act as purchasers of public 
health care on behalf of the poor. This role is typically carried out by local NGOs, who also screen 
households, or patients, to identify those entitled to subsidies.  
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Twelve ODs and six national hospitals are supported by a government subsidy scheme (known as SUBO) 
that operates through the Ministry of Health and compensates facilities for user fee revenue lost through 
granting of exemptions. For brevity, we will sometimes refer to this as a government funded, or operated, 
HEF although this is rather imprecise. It is quite a different model from that of a HEF operating as an 
independent third-party purchaser.   
OD level autonomy and mostly external funding creates a great deal of heterogeneity in the design and 
operation of HEFs. With this in mind, a typical HEF benefit package covers district referral hospital 
medical services, transport costs from health centre to referral hospital, food for patients and carers, and 
sometimes funeral costs. The government subsidy scheme does not cover transport and food costs. In 
2008, 38% of all hospitalised patients and 25% of deliveries at covered referral hospitals were funded by 
HEFs (Ministry of Health, 2009b).1
If public hospitals were operating at full capacity, then HEF subsidization of the poor would be expected 
to crowd out non-subsidized patients. But utilisation of public sector care is low and hospitals typically 
have spare capacity. HEF funding that increases facility revenue and, consequently, staff attendance can 
then generate benefits that extend beyond the direct recipients of the subsidy. It is not the public sector 
user fee that causes non-poor patients to seek private sector alternatives since the latter are typically more 
expensive. It appears to be the perceived difference in quality that is decisive. A better stocked and more 
reliable public sector may therefore increase utilisation and reduce OOP payments of households that are 
not identified as HEF beneficiaries. 
 Where case study sample sizes permit disaggregation, which is 
seldom, it is evident that women are the largest group of HEF beneficiaries, followed by children. On 
average, around one-quarter of user fee revenue is estimated to flow from HEFs (Annear et al., 2006), 
although there is a great deal of variation (Annear et al., 2007; Ir, 2008; Ir and Hardeman, 2003).  
Assessment of subsidy eligibility is carried out before (pre-identification) and/or after (post-identification) 
presentation for treatment. In the early years, most HEFs only operated post-identification. This involved 
a means test, based on asset ownership, applied at the NGO office on the hospital site. Pre-identification 
of households eligible for fee exemptions has increased over time and is implemented usually with a 
combination of means test screening of a population and consultation with community representatives on 
which households are considered poor. There is usually still an opportunity for patients to apply for HEF 
coverage at the hospital. While reducing exclusion errors, this may increase inclusion errors if there is 
gaming of the means test to qualify for exemption when treatment is needed. In fact, inclusion errors 
have been estimated at only around 10% (Annear, 2010; Jordanwood et al., 2009), and most HEF 
beneficiaries are amongst the poorest households (Hardeman et al., 2004). Exclusion errors are estimated 
to be much higher at 25% or so (Annear, 2010; Jordanwood et al., 2009).  
In the early years of operation, the means test and community consultation procedures used to identify 
the poor varied a great deal with the funder and operator of the HEF. From 2007, the Ministry of 
Planning began implementing standardised procedures (known as IDPoor) to identify poor households 
and establish entitlement to a variety of government and non-government assistance programmes, 
including HEFs. Households are screened by a common means test, the score from which is taken into 
account by a Village Representative Group, whose recommendation on households to be classified as 
poor is considered and revised after consultation at the village level, and finally approved following review 
by the Commune Council (Ministry of Planning, 2007). IDPoor has spread geographically, with HEFs 
playing an important role in its implementation, but by 2009 it did not yet cover the whole country.                                                               1 Cited by (Annear, 2010)p.5. Ministry of Health data for 2010 indicate that 6.3% of outpatient cases, 27% of 
inpatient cases and 15.6% of deliveries at all public health facilities (not only referral hospitals) were funded by 
HEFs 
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Expansion of IDPoor is contributing to realisation of the policy goals of greater uniformity in the 
operation of HEFs and nationwide coverage. Expansion of the government subsidy scheme is the most 
likely means of realising the recent commitment made by the Prime Minister to tax finance health care for 
the poor at public facilities. Besides the source of finance, the ‘government HEF’ differs from the 
externally funded ones in two important respects that may weaken effectiveness. First, there is no third-
party NGO acting as a purchaser of care and so providers must seek compensation through the often 
slow and inefficient public administration. Second, transport and food costs are not subsidised. 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA 
3.1 IDENTIFYING INFORMATION AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
We use data from the 2004, 2007, 2008 and 2009 Cambodian Socio-Economic Surveys (CSES). In 2004, 
HEFs were operating in 16 ODs (out of a total of 77) in which one-quarter of the population was 
resident (Table 1). By 2007, the number of ODs with HEFs had almost doubled and by 2009 it had more 
than trebled, such that the fraction of the population living in HEF areas had reached three-quarters. We 
use this variation in HEF coverage both between districts and across time in a difference-in-differences 
(DID) strategy comparing changes in outcomes occurring in areas in which a HEF comes into operation 
with changes in outcomes in areas that remain without a HEF. 
Each CSES is nationally representative and all follow the same stratified sampling design. Primary 
sampling is at the ‘village’ level, which defines neighbourhoods of towns and cities as well as rural villages. 
The 2004 and 2009 surveys sampled around 720 villages and 12,000 households, while in 2007 and 2008 
half the number of villages, and just less than one-third of the number of households, were sampled. In 
each of 2007 and 2008 the villages sampled were a subset of those sampled in 2004. The 2009 survey 
sampled (potentially) different villages. In order to eliminate the risk of compositional bias, we would like 
to keep the sample of villages constant between 2004 and 2009. This is not quite possible since the village 
codes are not consistent across surveys. There are consistent identifiers at the commune level, which 
represents a slightly wider geographic area.2
While HEFs are implemented at the OD level, within a survey year there is variation in HEF coverage 
across communes within an OD due to differences in the interview date, which can differ by up to 12 
months. Of the 42 ODs that acquired a HEF between 2004 and 2009,
 In our estimation sample we include only those communes 
sampled in 2009 that were also sampled in 2004.  
3
There are very few communes for which we could not establish HEF coverage (Table 1). These are 
dropped from the sample. Selecting only communes sampled in 2004 and in at least one other year, we 
lose around 30% of communes from the 2004 CSES and 45% of those from the 2009 sample (Table 1). 
There is no loss in 2007 and 2008 since all those sampled in those years were also sampled in 2004. We 
arrive at the estimation sample by dropping the 30% of communes that already had HEF coverage in 
 in 11 the HEF was functioning in 
only some of the communes at the time they were surveyed in the initial year of operation. For example, 
in one OD a commune was surveyed one month before a HEF came into operation, while another 
commune had been exposed to the HEF for seven months by the time it was surveyed later in the year. 
We identify a commune as being covered if the HEF has been operating for at least one month at the 
time of the survey. 
                                                             2 In the 2004-2009 CSES samples used in estimation there are, on average, 1.4 villages within each commune and 
72% of communes consist of only one village. 
3 This appears inconsistent with the numbers in Table 1 only because the table records ODs that acquired a HEF 
during 2004 as having a HEF in 2004. 
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2004. The DID estimates are thus derived from comparisons between communes that acquire a HEF 
after 2004 with those that remain without a HEF in subsequent survey waves. The estimation sample 
corresponds to one half of the full CSES cross-section sample of households in 2004, two-thirds in 2007 
and 2008 and a little less than two-fifths in 2009 (Table 1). An important exclusion is the capital city, 
Phnom Penh. Operation of HEFs in the capital is confined to the slum areas and these were already 
covered by 2004 and so households in Phnom Penh are excluded from the estimation sample. 
Around a quarter of the estimation sample of communes (and households) that did not have HEF 
coverage in 2004 was covered by 2007. Over half was covered by 2008 and two-thirds by 2009 (Table 1).  
TABLE 1 
3.2 HEF COVERAGE AT THE HOUSEHOLD LEVEL 
Not the whole population of an area in which a HEF operates directly benefits from it. At least in 
principle, HEF subsidies are targeted on the poor. Since the CSES did not ask about receipt or 
entitlement to subsidized health care until 2009, it is not possible to identify treatment status, in the form 
of HEF funded exemptions, at the household level. The 2009 data can be used to examine the extent to 
which HEFs make the poor’s legal entitlement to user fee exemptions effective. In areas in which a HEF 
was operating, over 6% of households reported receipt of free or subsidized health care in the last 12 
months, and a further 2% reported entitlement without receiving treatment (Table 2). In areas with no 
HEF, the corresponding figures are 1% and 0.5%. Clearly, there is a strong correlation between HEF 
operation and reported subsidization.   
To assess the targeting of subsidies on the poor in 2009 we construct an indicator of household living 
standards from a principal components analysis (PCA) of household characteristics, including housing 
materials, ownership of durables, land and livestock (see Appendix, Table A1), that are also weighted in 
the IDPoor programme. We use PCA because the CSES does not have the complete information 
necessary to apply the IDPoor means test. From the second panel of Table 2 it is clear that health care 
subsidies are disproportionately directed to the poor. The poorest quintile of households account for 43% 
of all those in receipt or entitled to subsidies. Moving up the wealth distribution, the proportion of 
subsidized households falls monotonically. However, 17% of those receiving or entitled to subsidies are 
in the top two quintiles of the wealth index distribution. Since the PCA score is only an imperfect 
indicator of poverty, and not that used to establish HEF subsidy entitlement, we cannot interpret these 
numbers as unbiased measures of the target inefficiency of the subsidies. They do suggest, however, that 
there is substantial leakage to non-poor households.  
In the DID analysis, we examine whether the HEF impact varies between households below and above 
the 40th percentile of the year specific wealth index distribution. This threshold is chosen because data 
from IDPoor reveal that, on average, around 30% of households are identified as poor and entitled to 
subsidisation. However, the proportion does vary substantially across districts. Further, our wealth index 
does not correspond to the IDPoor score or to the assessment employed by HEFs for much of the 
period of analysis. Allowing for these discrepancies, the 40th percentile seems a reasonable threshold 
around which to consider variation in the HEF effect. Of course, we certainly cannot rule out that there 
are HEF beneficiaries in the top 60% of the wealth index distribution and there may be an indirect impact 






We examine four types of outcomes: payments for health care, health-related debt, non-medical 
consumption and health care utilisation. Health payments are recorded as the total amount spent on 
health care for each household member in the last four weeks. We aggregate across individuals to get total 
household spending on health care. In 2008, spending on health care was not asked in the health module 
of the survey resulting in an inconsistency that forces us to drop this wave from the analysis of payments. 
In 2009, payments for health services and medicines were recorded separately from health care-related 
transport costs. Comparison of descriptive statistics suggests that respondents in previous waves included 
transport costs in the amounts reported. We therefore aggregate payments and transport costs in 2009 
and rely on a year dummy variable in the models to control for any discrepancy. Payments are deflated to 
constant 2000 prices using the non-food consumer price index.4
In Table 3 we split households into those living in communes that acquired a HEF between 2004 and 
2009 and those in communes that remained without a HEF. We present means of the outcomes by these 
‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups in 2004 and 2009. This is done to give a general impression of any 
baseline and trend differences between households that get exposed to a HEF and those that do not. In 
the DID estimation a household is used as a control in any survey year in which it has not yet been 
exposed to a HEF.  
  
At the beginning of the period, three per cent more of the control than the treatment group incurred any 
payments for health care in the last month. The percentage making health payments increased for both 
groups over time, but more so in both absolute and relative terms for those that remained without a 
HEF. Conditional on making any payment, the mean payment was slightly lower for this control group in 
2004 at 7980 Riel ($2.08) per month. Over time, the inflation-adjusted amount of payment increased 
substantially for both groups but, again, to a greater extent in both absolute and relative terms for those 
that did not acquire a HEF, for whom it reached 21164 Riel ($5.51) by 2009. Unconditional differences-
in-differences, which can be computed by comparing group-specific changes in means, are suggestive of 
HEFs being effective in constraining the increase in health care payments.  
The CSES asks whether the household has any loans that were taken out principally because of illness or 
injury. No distinction is made between borrowing to pay for health care and to replace earnings lost due 
to work incapacity. Nonetheless, this provides the opportunity to test for an impact of HEFs on health-
related debt. We sum the amount borrowed through all outstanding loans taken out primarily because of 
illness or injury to get the total health-related debt incurred.  
In both treatment and control communes, just over 5% of households had health-related debt in 2004 
(Table 3). The prevalence of debt fell for both groups over time but more so in areas in which a HEF 
started to operate. Among households with health-related debt, the mean amount increased by more than 
100% between 2004 and 2009 in the treatment areas but by almost 200% in the control areas. So, the 
probability of incurring health-related debt fell by more in areas where a HEF was introduced and the 
positive amount of debt increased by less in these areas. 
We measure household living standards by per capita household consumption net of payments for health 
care. This is the aggregate of expenditures on food and non-food items, plus the value of food produced 
for household consumption. Between 2004 and 2009, real non-medical consumption increased by more 
than 100% in both treatment and control areas but both the absolute and relative increase was greater in 
areas that obtained HEF coverage (Table 3).                                                              4 Unfortunately, the only available price index for the 2004-09 period is specific to Phnom Penh. There was very 
rapid inflation in food prices in 2008. Non-food inflation was much less marked.  
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The household head or spouse is asked whether each household member experienced any illness, injury 
or health problem in the last four weeks. He or she is also asked whether each individual sought health 
care over the same period. In the 2004 survey, the question on utilisation (and payments) was posed only 
if sickness was reported for an individual. We examine the probability of seeking health care among 
individuals for whom sickness is reported. When health care use is recorded, the respondent is asked 
from which provider care is usually sought, with options including different types of hospital, health 
centre, drug store, traditional healer, etc. We distinguish between respondents reporting their main 
provider to be in the public sector (national, provincial and district hospitals and health centres), the 
private sector (private hospitals and clinics), and those mainly using pharmacies and drug vendors. 
In 2004, around 18% of individuals in both the treatment and control groups reported illness, injury or a 
health problem in the last four weeks (Table 3). The percentage fell by 2.5 points in areas that had 
acquired a HEF by 2009 but increased slightly in areas that remained without a HEF. At the beginning of 
the period, around two-thirds of individuals reporting illness sought care. Fortunately, the propensity to 
use health care when sick increased dramatically over time and by roughly the same degree in both 
treatment and control areas. Of the individuals that sought care, the proportion that did so in the public 
sector increased over time in areas that acquired a HEF, while it fell slightly in the control areas. The bias 
in favour of utilisation of private sector care increased over time in the control areas but not in the 
treatment areas. These trends are consistent with HEFs shifting patterns of utilisation toward the public 
sector. Only the trends in the utilisation of pharmacies are in the opposite direction. The propensity to 
use pharmacies increased over time in the treatment areas but fell in control areas.  
TABLE 3 
4. ESTIMATION AND SPECIFICATION  
4.1 ESTIMATION 
We estimate modified two-part models (Mullahy, 1998) of OOP payments with fixed effects. Let ictI  be 
an indicator of whether household i, in commune c  at time period t incurs any OOP payments and 
assume this is determined as follows,  
 ( )1 1 1 1 11 0ict ct ct ict t c ictI HEFβ τ λ ε= + + + + + >Zγ X θ  (1) 
where 1(.) is the indicator function and the error ( )ictε  is assumed to follow a logistic distribution. The 
time varying dummy variable ctHEF is equal to one in periods in which a HEF operates in a commune. 
We control, through dummy variables, for year effects ( )1tτ  that are common across all communes and 
commune specific effects ( )1cλ  that are fixed across all periods. The bias due to the latter incidental 
parameters is likely to be very small by virtue of the large number of households (38 on average) per 
commune (Coupè, 2005; Greene, 2004; Heckman, 1981; Katz, 2001). Time varying commune level 
covariates ( )ctZ  (see next sub-section) are included to increase plausibility of the DID identifying 
assumption by controlling for changes in determinants of health care expenditure and utilisation that are 
correlated with, but not caused by, the introduction of a HEF. Time varying household level determinants 
( )ictX are included both to gain precision and to avoid bias in the instance that their year specific 
commune level averages are correlated with the introduction of HEFs. The vector includes, among other 
characteristics (see next sub-section), a set of dummies indicating the wealth index quintile of the 
household. Since the wealth indices are year specific and because the trends in outcomes might differ by 
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wealth, we allow the wealth effects to be time varying. Although it is not made explicit in (1), we also 
control for month effects to allow for seasonal variation in the demand for health care. 
The average effect of a HEF on the probability of incurring OOP payments across the population in 
HEF covered areas during periods of operation is estimated by  
  ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ,
HEF




β τ λ τ λ
∈
= Λ + + + + −Λ + + +∑ Zγ X θ Z γ X θ  (2) 
where ( ).Λ is the logistic distribution function, HEFS is the set of observations for which 1ctHEF =  and 
HEFN is the number of such observations. 
The expectation of OOP payments ( )icty over their positive range is specified as an exponential function,  
 ( )2 2 2 2 20 expict ict ct ct ict t cE y y HEFβ τ λ >  = + + + +  Zγ X θ . (3) 
The error of this Generalised Linear Model (GLM) is assumed to follow a gamma distribution. The 
average effect of a HEF on mean positive payments among those with such payments in the treated 
population is estimated by  
  ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 21 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆexp exp 1 ,
HEF







 = + + + − ∑ Zγ X θ  (4) 
where HEFS + is the subset of HEFS with positive OOP payments and HEFN + is the number of such 
households. We also estimate the ATT relative to the counterfactual, which is simply 
 ( )2 2ˆexp 1RATT β= − .  
Standard errors for the average treatment effects are calculated by a delta method that takes account of 
sample clusters (Korn and Graubard, 1999). Despite allowance for commune fixed effects, the cluster 
adjustment is intentionally not applied at the commune-year level but one level up at the commune level 
in order to allow for possibly serially correlated commune-level shocks that would result in overstatement 
of the precision of the DID estimate, which is identified from variation in HEF exposure at the 
commune, rather than the household, level (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Bertrand et al., 2004).  
Putting the two parts of the model together, the average effect of a HEF on mean OOP payments among 
the exposed population is estimated by  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆexp
ˆ ˆˆ ˆexp
HEF
ct ict t c ct ict t c
i SHEF
ct ict t c
ATT
N
β τ λ β τ λ
τ λ
∈
 = Λ + + + + −Λ + + + 
× + + +




In proportionate terms, it is  
 
( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1
2
1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ1 ˆexp 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆHEF
ct ict t c






Λ + + + +
= −





HEFs are intended to target the poor and are therefore expected to have a greater impact on the poor 
population. To allow for this explicitly, beyond that arising from non-linearity of the estimators, we 
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extend the specifications to include interaction terms between HEF and poverty status, such that 
equation (3) becomes   
 ( )2 2 2 2 2 20 expict ict ct ct ict ct ict t cE y y HEF HEF POORβ δ τ λ >  = + × + + + +  Zγ X θ  (7) 
and equation (1) is extended analogously. POORict  is an indicator of poverty status defined, as explained in 
the previous section, by location below the 40th percentile of the (year specific) wealth index. Keep in 
mind that X includes indicators of wealth index quintiles interacted with the year effects. So, we are 
allowing outcomes and their trends to differ by wealth level in both treatment and control areas. Given 
our imprecise notation that uses 2β  to represent different parameters in (3) and (7), the treatment effects 
for the non-poor are as above except for summation over the non-poor subset of the defined 
populations. For the poor, the treatment effects, which are the incremental effects of HEFct, are also 
functions of the interaction terms.  
Since the HEF benefit package is usually restricted to, or dominated by, treatment at a district hospital, 
we expect households living closer to such facilities to benefit most from the subsidy. To test this, we 
extend the two-part model of health payments to include a three-way interaction between the HEF 
indicator, poverty status and whether the household’s village is located within 5 kilometres of a district 
hospital.  
The treatment effect may vary not only with the characteristics of the household but also those of the 
HEF. For example, the effectiveness may vary with vintage. It has been claimed that HEF membership 
peaks after about 18 months of operation. In using intra OD variation in HEF coverage created by 
differences in the interview date of the survey of up to 12 months, we assume any HEF effect is evident 
within this period. We distinguish between HEFs that have been operating for no more than one year 
( )1actHEF =  and those that have operated for longer than a year ( )1bctHEF =  and estimate two-part 
models that include these indicators and their interactions with poverty status. For example, the 
expectation of positive expenditures is specified as,  
( )1 2 1 2 2 2 2 20 exp a b a bict ict ct ct ct ict ct ict ct ict t cE y y HEF HEF HEF POOR HEF POORξ ξ η η τ λ >  = + + × + × + + + +  Zγ X θ
            (8) 
Treatment effects for short and long vintage HEFs, each potentially varying with poverty status of the 
household, are derived from this specification following the general procedures described above.  
Heterogeneity of effect by whether or not the HEF is independently operated is of particular interest 
given the proposed nationwide rollout of HEFs following the model of the government subsidy scheme 
with no third-party NGO operator and subsidisation of user fees only (not transport and food costs). 
Around 10% of the sample in treatment areas is covered by the government subsidy scheme. We test for 
heterogeneity by estimating models specified as in (8) in which the treatment indicators identify 
independently operated HEFs and ‘government HEFs’.  
Since 1999 there has been performance-based contracting of the management of public health services to 
NGOs in some districts. Contractors assume responsibility for delivering the mandatory health service 
package of a district. They have greater freedom in setting terms and conditions of staff and their funding 
can be partly contingent on the realisation of performance targets. An evaluation of contracting in five 
districts found that it improved targeted maternal and child health outcomes, and reduced household 
OOP health expenditures (Bhushan et al., 2007). There is some evidence indicative of contracting raising 
public hospital occupancy rates (Annear et al., 2006) and it has been claimed that it works best when 
operating in conjunction with HEF subsidisation of user fees (Annear et al., 2007). Around 17% of the 
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treatment sample of households is in areas with contracting in addition to HEF coverage. We control for 
the presence of contracting and allow the effect of HEFs to differ depending upon whether they operate 
in conjunction with contracting by again implementing models based on a specification like (8).  
There is little evidence on the impact of contracting itself on household health expenditures in Cambodia 
and elsewhere. The Bhushan et al. (2007) study was intended to be a randomised experiment but 
nonconformity with assigned treatments meant that randomisation was eventually used as an instrument 
for contracting. Further, coverage of only five treatment districts means that statistical power is limited. 
Given this paucity of evidence, we exploit the geographic variation in whether and when contracting is 
introduced to identify the impact of performance-based contracting on OOP payments using the same 
DID approach used to identify the impact of HEFs.  
Treatment effects on the other outcomes are estimated using the same general specifications but with 
different estimators. Because relatively few households incur health-related debt (Table 3) there is 
insufficient within commune variation to make inclusion of a full set of commune dummies in the second 
part of the model feasible. Instead, we control for time invariant differences between treatment and 
control communes through a dummy to indicate residence in a commune that eventually gets a HEF, in 
addition to the dummy indicating HEF coverage at the time of the survey. All the health care utilisation 
outcomes are binary and are modelled by logit with dummies to control for the commune effects. For 
these outcomes, the analysis is at the individual, rather than the household, level. 
 
4.2 CONTROL VARIABLES 
Controls at the village level are particularly useful to avoid bias that could arise if there are epidemics, 
changes in health care supply or other programmes implemented at the same time as a HEF. 
Descriptions, means and changes in means of these control variables are given in Table 4 separately for 
communes that acquired a HEF by 2009 (‘treatment group’) and those that did not (‘control group’). Few 
covariates display group differences in baseline means. There are some differences in the changes in 
means, which confirms the value of being able to control for these time varying characteristics. For 
example, the prevalence of malaria and dengue increase in treatment relative to control areas, which 
would have biased the analysis toward finding increased health care payments and utilisation in areas that 
remained without a HEF if it were not possible to control for these differential trends. On the other 
hand, the operation of public health programmes, which by providing preventive care should reduce 
health expenditures, increased by more in control areas and the availability of private clinics and drug 
vendors fell significantly only in these areas. The latter may explain the reduced use of pharmacies in 
control areas observed in Table 3.  
At the household level, we control for household demographics, housing, urban/rural location, economic 
activity, wealth index quintiles, and head of household demographics, education, occupation, disability 
status and ethnicity (Table 4). There are few differences between control and treatment households in 
2004, besides those that acquire a HEF being less likely to reside in rural areas, but more significant 
changes in means across time for both groups, which could have biased the estimates if it were not 
possible to control for these covariates. 
The models for utilisation include the village and household level covariates listed in Table 4 except that 
for adults the individual’s own education, economic activity and occupation is used rather than that of the 
head of household. In addition, we control for possible changes in demographic composition through 




The estimated effects of HEFs on payments for health care are presented in Table 5. There is no 
indication of an effect on the probability that a household makes any payment for health care. This is to 
be expected. HEFs mainly pay for care at district hospitals and subsidize related transport and food costs. 
It is unlikely that they will eliminate all expenditures related to an episode of illness. There may be self-
medication and private care may be sought prior to seeking care at the public hospital (Annear, 2010).  
Among households that make some payment for health care, on average, HEFs reduce the monthly per 
capita amount by around 7000 Riel, equivalent to $1.80. While this does not seem much, it represents a 
29% reduction from a baseline average of around 24000 Riel ($6.20). The reduction in absolute terms 
does not reach statistical significance, but the relative decrease is significant at the 5% level. This is 
because the ATT is a function of all the parameters and covariates included in the model, while the 
RATT is computed only from the coefficient on the HEF indicator. Combining the estimated effects on 
the probability of any payment and the conditional amount of payment, we estimate that, on average over 
all households, a HEF reduces the amount paid by 3084 Riel ($0.80), or 27%.5
The estimated average effect of a HEF on health payments (conditional on there being any payment) is 
larger in both absolute and relative terms for the poor, defined as households in the bottom 40% ranked 
by the wealth index. For these households, the positive amount of health payments is estimated to fall by 
a substantial and highly significant 35%. For households above the 40th percentile of wealth, payments are 
estimated to fall by 25% and this is significant only at the 10% level. Subject to the caveat that our 
ranking of households based on possession of assets, housing conditions and economic activity is only 
indicative of relative poverty status, it appears that HEFs are indeed successful in targeting financial 
protection on the most poor. Stratifying by an indicator that more closely corresponds to the poverty 
assessment conducted by HEFs would presumably reveal even greater bias toward the ‘poor’ but would 




Since HEFs subsidize care received at public health facilities, principally district hospitals, one expects 
their impact on payments to be greater for those obtaining care mainly from the public sector. But, to the 
extent that HEFs encourage substitution of public for private care and for self-medication, payments to 
these other providers may also be reduced. Lack of data on payments made specifically to each type of 
provider makes it difficult to reach firm conclusions about the extent to which subsidisation of public 
care leads to its substitution for other sources of treatment. Nonetheless, comparing the impact of HEFs 
on total OOP payments across households that differ in the provider from which they report usually 
seeking care is informative. The relevant estimates from the second part of two-part models are presented 
in Table 6.6
Among households in which a public provider is reported as the main source of care for at least one 
person, the introduction of a HEF is estimated to reduce total OOP payments for health care by a 
significant 18,617 Riel ($4.84), or 43%. The effect is even larger (56%) for poor households and is a 
 
                                                             5 We do not compute a standard error for the overall effect. Although it could be obtained from a bootstrap, it 
would be a function of all coefficients and covariates from both parts of the model. 6 Conditional on seeking care and so reporting a usual provider, almost all observations make some payment and so 
the first part of the model is not interesting. In any case, for all the models permitting heterogeneous effects 
estimated, we never found any significant impact on the probability of incurring OOP payments for any group and 
so report only the conditional mean estimates in Table 6. 
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marginally significant 30% for non-poor households mainly using public care. These suggest very 
substantial direct gains from the subsidy to public care. The estimated effects are consistently negative 
and, as expected, smaller in magnitude for those principally using private clinics, hospitals and traditional 
healers, but they are never close to significance.  
Among households that report usually seeking treatment from a pharmacy or drug vendor, there is a 
significant reduction of around 5,500 Riel ($1.44) in total OOP payments. While this is less than a third of 
the average decrease in payments among households that mainly rely on public providers, it still 
represents a 40% reduction relative to a lower average. The effect is significant for both poor and non-
poor households, and in relative terms is larger (45%) among the former. These reductions could derive 
from reduced payments for public care among those that rely mainly, but not exclusively, on the purchase 
of medicines from drug vendors. They could also result from reduced reliance on self-medication or even 
a reduction in prices charged by drug vendors in response to the subsidized public care. Unfortunately, 
with the data at hand it is not possible to cast light on the relative importance of these potential 
explanations. 
For households within 5 kilometres of a district hospital, HEFs reduce (positive) health payments by 
around 13,500 Riel ($3.50) on average, or 45% (Table 6).7
The estimated effect of HEFs implemented as part of the government subsidy scheme is negative but not 
significant (Table 6).
 The effect is larger in both absolute and relative 
terms among the poor but it is significant even for the non-poor living close to a district hospital. For 
households located further away, the estimated effects are much smaller and are never close to 
significance. Despite the fact that HEFs often subsidize transport costs, this does not seem to be 
sufficient to overcome the barriers created by remoteness from the subsidized facilities. Contrary to the 
idea that HEFs require time to accumulate effectiveness, those that have been operating for a year or less 
reduce health payments by as much as older ones (Table 6). However, the impact on the poor relative to 
the non-poor appears to be larger in the more mature HEFs, which suggests some improvements in 
targeting over time. Since pre-identification of HEF beneficiaries is usually implemented after post-
identification, this result could reflect the more effective targeting of the poor achieved by the former, as 
well as increased awareness of HEF availability among potential beneficiaries. 
8
The impact on OOP payments is much larger when HEFs operate in conjunction with the contracting of 
public health services (Table 6). In areas without contracting, the HEF effect is less than half of the 
 When implementation is through NGOs, the absolute effect is significant at 10% 
and approximately double the point estimate for government implemented HEFs. Independent NGO-
operated HEFs are estimated to reduce (positive) OOP payments by 32% on average, by 37% for the 
poor and by a marginally significant 27% for the non-poor. The muted impact of the government HEFs 
is consistent with failings of the government subsidy scheme identified by a recent qualitative evaluation 
(Men et al., 2011). Burdensome and inefficient Ministry of Health bureaucracy raises the administrative 
costs of applying for compensation and the delay before receiving it. This reduces the incentive for 
facilities to grant exemptions. Incentives are further eroded by flat rate reimbursements that are often 
insufficient to cover costs and are lower than those paid by independent HEFs. Despite the bureaucracy, 
there is no effective monitoring of claims leaving the scheme vulnerable to leakage of funds and spending 
on fictitious patients. On the demand side, the lack of coverage of transport and food costs is perceived 
to be an important limitation on the financial protection offered to patients. 
                                                             7 We found no significant impact on the probability of incurring any health payments for any of the groups 
identified in the right-hand panel of Table 6 and so present only estimates from the second part of the respective 
two-part models.  8 Because only 6% of the sample are in areas with a government operated HEF, we do not estimate heterogeneous 
effects by poverty status for these HEFs. 
15  
absolute effect in areas with contracting. When operating alongside contracting, HEFs reduce mean 
(positive) OOP payments by a significant 39%. In the absence of contracting the relative effect is an 
insignificant 16%. It is larger (27%) and marginally significant for the poor but in areas where a HEF 
operates together with contracting the relative impact on the poor is a much larger 42%.   
TABLE 6 
In Table 7 we present the estimated effects on OOP payments of performance-based contracting itself. 
Across all households, contracting significantly reduces OOP payments by the equivalent of $2.27 per 
month, or 38%. This is consistent with the large negative effect estimated by (Bhushan et al., 2007), who 
attribute it to contracting encouraging substitution of public for private providers in response to the 
improved quality of service available from the former. Their study found that contracting reduced staff 
absence at public facilities, decreased the propensity to use unqualified providers and increased the 
probability of using qualified public sector providers.  
We find no significant effect of contracting on OOP payments among poor households but a larger and 
strongly significant effect (47%) for non-poor households. The reason for this differential impact is not 
immediately obvious. One possibility is that only the better-off households have the economic means to 
take advantage of the improved quality of public health services. But this is not supported by the fact that 
the differential impact is just as evident when contracting operates together with a HEF, which should 
weaken the price barrier for the poorer. The negative impact of contracting on OOP payments is 
increased in the presence of a HEF. The point estimate is much smaller and significance is lost when 
there is no HEF compensating for lost user fee revenue. This, together with the finding that the impact 
of HEFs is stronger when operating together with contracting, suggests that the combination of supply 
and demand side interventions helps realise a reduction in household health expenditures.  
TABLE 7 
Health-related debt and non-medical consumption 
HEFs succeed in reducing payments for health care, particularly for poorer households, those mainly 
using public health care and those living close to a district hospital. Does this result in less borrowing to 
pay for health care and/or increased spending on other goods and services? There is no evidence 
whatsoever that HEFs reduce the probability of incurring health-related debt (Table 8). Conditional on 
the existence of health-related debt, HEFs have a negative effect on its level. On average, it is estimated 
that the amount of debt is reduced by 52,179 Riel ($13.58). Although this absolute effect is not 
significant, the relative effect of 25% is. Both effects are significant for the poor and they are larger than 
those estimated for the non-poor, which are not significant.  
Since these estimates are based on only 665 households with health-related debt, one may worry about 
their sensitivity to outliers. For this reason, estimates from a robust GLM estimator (Cantoni and 
Ronchetti, 2006) are also presented. The robust estimates for all households and for poor households are 
reasonably close to those obtained from standard GLM. Both relative effects are strongly significant, 
although inference should be conducted with some caution since the standard errors of the robust 
estimates have not been adjusted for clustering. For the non-poor, the robust estimator delivers a much 
larger estimate of the treatment effect, with the result that the relative effect (28%) is the same as that for 
the poor and is significant at the 10% level. We conclude that there is evidence that HEFs reduce the 
amount of health-related debt among households with such debt by 25-28%. The estimated impact on 
health-related debt across all households (Table 8, final columns) is very small in absolute (although not 
relative) terms because the vast majority of households do not incur such debt. 
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Despite the reduction in payments for health care, there is no evidence that the household resources 
released are used to raise consumption of other goods and services. The point estimates of the impact of 
HEFs on non-medical expenditure presented in the second panel of Table 8 are consistently positive, but 
none is close to significance.9
TABLE 8 
 This suggests that households mainly use borrowing, saving, asset 
depletion, etc. to pay for health care rather than cutting back on consumption.  
Health care utilisation 
In Table 9 we present estimates of the estimated impact of HEFs on the probability of reporting illness 
and utilisation of health care. Besides poverty status, we disaggregate by gender and age since mothers 
and children are likely to benefit most from the services that HEFs subsidise.  
Estimated effects of HEFs on the propensity to report illness in the last four weeks are negative for all 
population groups (Table 9, panel 1). However, in no case is the estimated effect close to reaching 
statistical significance. Conditional on reporting illness, the introduction of a HEF has no significant 
impact on the probability of seeking care for all groups. This is perhaps not surprising since HEFs are 
more likely to influence the pattern of health care seeking behaviour than the aggregate rate of utilisation. 
We test for this by conditioning on reporting illness and seeking care and modelling the propensity to 
seek care mainly from a public provider, a private provider or a pharmacy/drug vendor. There is no 
significant effect on the probability of seeking public care for all groups. The effects on the probability of 
seeking care from a private provider are consistently negative. Significance is reached for the effect 
averaged across the whole treated sample and across the non-poor. The larger and more significant effect 
on the non-poor than the poor may be due to the fact that the former are more likely to be using private 
providers in the first instance. There are also significant negative reductions in the propensity of women 
and children to use private care. These results suggests that HEFs may discourage utilisation of private 
providers but the lack of a positive and significant impact on public care is not consistent with this being 
achieved through substitution of public for private care. The effects on the probability of visiting a 
pharmacy or drug vendor are consistently positive, which is the opposite of the desired effect of HEFs 
reducing self-medication, but are never close to significant. The significant reduction in total OOP 
payments among those mainly relying on drug vendors observed in Table 6 does not therefore appear to 
be due to any impact of HEFs on the composition of this group.  
TABLE 9 
6. CONCLUSION 
Poorly resourced health systems struggle to achieve an appropriate balance between raising revenue 
essential for service provision and financial protection of the poorest households from health care costs. 
Because user fees are such an important source of revenue, providers have no incentive to grant 
exemptions from them even when they are statutorily obliged to do so. Compensation of providers for 
the revenue lost through exemptions and separation of responsibilities for service provision and 
adjudication of exemption eligibility are essential ingredients of an effective fee waiver system. Health 
Equity Funds possess these characteristics.  
                                                             9 Estimating the log of non-medical consumption by OLS with commune fixed effects rather than GLM also gives 
positive point estimates but not remotely significant effects. Restricting to the sub-sample of households with 
positive OOP payments, there is still no significant the impact on non-medical consumption. 
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We evaluate the impact of HEFs on households’ payments for health care, their debts, non-medical 
consumption and health care utilisation in Cambodia. We find that HEFs have a significant and 
substantial negative impact on health care payments. On average over households making payments for 
health care in covered areas, HEFs reduce the amount paid by 29%. The effect is even larger for poor 
households, those mainly making use of public care and those living close to a district hospital, the main 
provider supported by HEFs. It is also larger when providers are compensated for lost user fee revenue 
through externally funded independent NGOs, rather than through the government subsidy scheme 
administered by the Ministry of Health. Contracting the management of public health services has a direct 
negative impact on household health expenditures and reduces them further through a synergy with 
HEFs.  
The latter findings suggest that the arm’s length relationship of HEFs with public providers is an 
important ingredient of their success. But this also poses a dilemma for their sustainability. In Cambodia, 
HEFs have been mainly funded by external donors. This leads to much heterogeneity in their operation 
and also means that the continued subsidisation of poor households is uncertain. In the long run, 
government funding is probably the only sustainable source of finance. The government of Cambodia has 
recently committed to tax financed care for the poor at public facilities with an expansion of the 
government subsidy scheme the most likely means of implementation. Our analysis suggests that this 
would weaken financial protection from health care costs. One reason is that the government scheme 
does not cover transport and food costs. A second is that it blurs the distinction between the finance and 
the provision of care and requires that facilities seek compensation for user fee exemptions through a 
bureaucratic and slow public administration.  
Rather than bring HEFs within the public system, it may be preferable to more clearly define their role as 
purchasers of health care for the poor within a system that also demarcates responsibility for the public 
funding of health care, including the subsidisation of the poor, and the provision of services, management 
of which could be contracted out. HEFs would continue to operate independently receiving a public 
subsidy to pay the user fees of the poor and relying on external funding to reimburse transport and food 
costs (Men et al., 2011). The evidence presented here is not sufficient to conclude decisively in favour of 
this tripartite model but our findings that independent HEFs and those operating alongside the 
contracting of public health services are more effective in reducing household payments for health care 
suggest that autonomy and division of responsibilities are important ingredients of success. 
Our estimate of a 29% reduction in mean (positive) OOP payments may seem surprisingly large given 
only around 8% of households in HEF covered areas report receipt of, or entitlement to, subsidised care 
and HEFs cover only public health services, while households make heavy use of private care and self-
medication.  One explanation is that many households may be ignorant of their HEF entitlement. It is 
estimated that around two-fifths of hospitalisations and one-quarter of deliveries at covered hospitals are 
financed through HEFs. Benefits from this substantial inflow of revenue are likely to extend beyond the 
households receiving the subsidy. Fee paying patients may be induced by increased stocks of supplies and 
better staff attendance to seek less expensive treatment from public providers rather than the more 
convenient but less medically effective private clinics and drug vendors.  
The estimated magnitude of the effect would be overestimated if HEFs were purposively located in areas 
in which health expenditures were expected to decline. HEF operators have little incentive to engage in 
such strategic location and their ability to forecast changes in health care utilisation and expenditures is 
likely to be limited in any case. More probable is that locations are selected on the basis of initial 
conditions. But this does not jeopardise the consistency of our difference-in-differences estimator. The 
strength of the parallel trends assumption required for identification of the effect is weakened not only by 
our ability to follow the same communes over time but also by control for changes in their observable 
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characteristics that could be correlated with health care utilisation and expenditures. These include public 
health programmes and development projects, which may be established in the same locations as HEFs 
in order to exploit economies of agglomeration arising from administrative infrastructures. Nonetheless, 
we cannot completely rule out the possibility that there are other projects attracted to the HEF sites that 
are not documented in the data. If this is the case and if these interventions reduce health expenditures, 
then the estimated impact of HEFs on OOP payments will be overestimated.  
We find no significant effects of HEFs on health care utilisation, which seems inconsistent with our 
estimates of large reductions in payments for health care. Subsidies that are effective in reducing the cost 
of care would be expected to raise utilisation as a consequence. We suspect that the data are not 
sufficiently rich to detect an effect on utilisation. With a four week reference period, binary indicators of 
utilisation, distinction between types of care only through a question about the ‘usual provider’ and an 
intervention targeted at care provided by district hospitals, the data may not contain the detail or have the 
power necessary to detect any effect on the level and pattern of utilisation. The impact of HEFs on 
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Table 1: Health Equity Fund coverage and sample selection 
  2004 2007 2008 2009 
Operational Districts (77 in total)     
With a Health Equity Fund (HEF) 16 30 47 53 
% of population in ODs with HEF 25.1 47.5 72.5 73.5 
Communes     
 Total number in Cambodia Socioeconomic Survey 692 293 291 621 
 With information on HEF coverage 684 290 288 617 
 Included in 2004 CSES and at least once 2007-2009 472 290 288 340 
 Without HEF coverage in 2004 (estimation sample) 332 205 203 230 







 Mean number of years with HEF coverage 0 0.53 1.08 2.01 
Households     
 In estimation sample 7473 2346 2311 4474 
 As % of total cross-section CSES sample 49.9% 65.3% 65.1% 37.4% 








Source: Authors’ calculations from Cambodian Socioeconomic Surveys (CSES). 
 
Table 2: Reported health care subsidization by HEF coverage and wealth quintile, 2009 
   HEF operating 
No HEF 
operating 
% reporting received free or subsidized treatment in last 12 months 6.2 1.1 
% reporting entitlement to, but not received, free or subsidized treatment 1.9 0.5 
Number of households 8857 3034 
   
% of those reporting receipt or entitlement to subsidy by wealth quintile 
 poorest 20%  43.3 
 2nd poorest  24.1 
 Middle  15.7 
 2nd richest  11.6 
 richest 20%  5.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Cambodia Socioeconomic Survey 2009 
Notes: Sample weights applied. Top panel is split by communes that are and are not covered by a HEF. Bottom 
panel is for both HEF and non-HEF areas. Quintiles of wealth index derived from principal components analysis of 
asset ownership, economic activity and housing conditions (see Appendix 1).  
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Table 3: Means of outcomes by treatment status 
 2004 2009 Change % change 
Households     
Percentage with any health payments     
 HEF introduced b/w 2004 & 2009 44.7 45.6 0.9 2.0 
 No HEF b/w 2004 & 2009 47.6 53.4 5.8 12.2 
Mean monthly health payment (if positive) (Riel)a   
 HEF introduced b/w 2004 & 2009 9415 18026 8611 91.5 
 No HEF b/w 2004 & 2009 7980 21164 13184 165.2 
      
Percentage with any health-related debt     
 HEF introduced b/w 2004 & 2009 5.2 3.58 -1.62 -31.2 
 No HEF b/w 2004 & 2009 5.3 4.85 -0.45 -8.5 
Mean health-related debt (if>0) (Riel)   
 HEF introduced b/w 2004 & 2009 90642 195594 104952 115.8 
 No HEF b/w 2004 & 2009 80924 236881 155957 192.7 
  
Mean monthly non-medical consumption per capita (Riel)  
 HEF introduced b/w 2004 & 2009 53622 126011 72389 135.0 
 No HEF b/w 2004 & 2009 48934 104145 55211 112.8 
      
Individuals  
Percentage reporting illness, injury or health problem (“ill”) in last 4 weeks  
 HEF introduced b/w 2004 & 2009 18.2 15.6 -2.6 -16.3 
 No HEF b/w 2004 & 2009 18.1 18.7  0.6     3.1 
Percentage seeking health care if ill  
 HEF introduced b/w 2004 & 2009 65.2 92.6 27.4 29.6 
 No HEF b/w 2004 & 2009 67.2 93.6 26.4 28.2 
Percentage usually seeking public health care if ill and seek care  
 HEF introduced b/w 2004 & 2009 13.7 18.3  4.6  25.2 
 No HEF b/w 2004 & 2009 15.1 13.7 -1.4 -10.2 
Percentage usually seeking private health care if ill and seek care  
 HEF introduced b/w 2004 & 2009 16.2 16.6 0.4  2.4 
 No HEF b/w 2004 & 2009 30.5 37.5 7.1 18.8 
Percentage usually going to pharmacists / drug vendor if ill and seek care  
 HEF introduced b/w 2004 & 2009 30.3 36.6  6.3  17.3 
 No HEF b/w 2004 & 2009 18.7 12.9 -5.9 -45.5 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Cambodia Socioeconomic Survey 
Notes: a Amounts deflated to December 2000 prices using non-food price index specific to Phnom Penh. 
In 2000, the official exchange rate was 3841 Riel to the US$. 
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Table 4: Baseline means and changes in means of control variables by treatment status 
  Baseline 2004 Change: 2009 – 2004 
 HEF after 2004 No HEF  HEF after 2004 No HEF 
Village level variables 
Distance to nearest district hospital < 5 km (%) 33.55 32.06 1.55 6.44 
Distance to nearest health center < = 2 km (%) 41.21 41.05 8.30+ 6.48 
Distance to nearest health centre ]2,5km] (%) 31.76* 42.97 -0.30 -3.81 
Village has bank or loan credit union (%) 31.30 30.92 9.58++ 12.51+ 
Any non-health govt. development project (%) 34.05 31.91 -2.28 8.76 
Any non-health NGO development project (%) 27.58 24.78 1.39 0.16 
Malaria is one of the most important health      
problems in village (%) 
35.67*** 19.52 -12.18+++ -6.21 
Dengue is one of the most important health 
problems in village (%) 
58.43 52.36 4.98 20.95+++ 
Any public health programme† (%) 72.95** 59.98 7.06+ 27.63+++ 
Village has a private clinic, drug shop or other 
shop selling drugs (%) 
31.78* 41.15 3.94 -16.13++ 
     
Household level variables     
log of household size 1.510 1.490 -0.038+++ 0.000 
number of children below 6y  0.509*** 0.449  0.069+++ 0.139+++ 
number of children 6y to 11y 0.605 0.585 0.021 0.064+ 
number of adults 45y and older 0.374** 0.417 0.041+++ 0.048+ 
House is rented (%) 0.64 0.34 2.54+++ 0.24 
Rural (%) 77.15*** 96.17 -2.58 -6.21+ 
Anyone in hhold. runs a company/business (%) 38.11 34.27 -3.29 1.55 
Anyone in hhold. engages fishing or aquatic 
farming (%) 
50.88 52.61 3.76 4.05 
Head of household 
Male (%) 77.36 77.58 0.98 3.84++ 
Elementary occupation (%) 7.55 7.23 1.39 1.73 
Moderately or severely disabled (%) 7.98 8.85 -1.29 0.10 
Unpaid family worker (%) 3.32 2.41 -3.01+++ -2.16+++ 
Civil servant (%) 12.13 14.16 -5.65+++ -9.64+++ 
Unemployed (%) 11.82 13.91 -5.24++ -5.55+++ 
No schooling (%) 31.23 28.61 -5.21++ -6.27++ 
School grades one to five (%) 36.41 37.36 1.46 2.30 
School grades six to twelve (%) 30.83 31.76 2.82 5.23++ 
log of age (in years)  3.75* 3.77 0.016 0.007 
Not Khmer (%) 4.89 3.29 -1.22 -0.70 
Notes:  
*, **, *** indicate significant difference between HEF and no HEF areas in baseline means at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels. 
+, ++, +++ indicate significant difference between 2004 and 2009 means at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 




Table 5: Effects of HEF on payments for health care (OOP) by poverty status 
 
 Pr(OOP>0) - Logit  E[OOP|OOP>0] - GLM  E[OOP] 
     Riel (3841 = $1)  Relative effect  Riel Rel. Eff. 
 ATT1 SE Baseline  ATT2 SE Baseline  RATT2 SE  ATT RATT 
            
All 0.008 0.041 0.452  -6923 4234 23814  -0.291**    0.121  -3084 -0.274 
Poor 0.011 0.046 0.443  -7561* 4583 21890  -0.345*** 0.131  -3205 -0.326 
Non-poor 0.007 0.042 0.459  -6055 4703 24766  -0.245* 0.143  -2780 -0.231 
N 12212    5606       12212  
 
Notes: Estimated from 2004, 2007 and 2009 CSES. Observations are households. GLM specified with Gamma 
distribution and log-link. Effects are average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) estimated as in equations (2), 
(4)-(6). Effects by poverty status obtained from (7) with partial effects averaged over appropriate sub-samples. All 
models control for covariates listed in Table 4 plus commune fixed effects, month effects, year effects and wealth 
quintile effects with the latter two interacted. Standard errors (SE) are computed by delta method and corrected for 
clustering at the commune level. Standard errors are not computed for the effects on E[OOP]. Baseline corresponds 
to the counterfactual (no treatment) probability / conditional mean. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 6: Heterogeneous effects of HEF on payments for health care (OOP)   
(conditional on OOP>0)  
 
   E[OOP|OOP>0] – GLM  
   ATT2 SE  RATT2 SE 
By whether household usually seeks care from,    N=5589  
 public provider All -18617** 8486  -0.428*** 0.123 
  Poor -25295** 11345  -0.563*** 0.121 
  Non-Poor -13588 9138  -0.304* 0.180 
 private provider All -10805 10052  -0.204 0.179 
  Poor -11394 17989  -0.172 0.302 
  Non-Poor -10540 9385  -0.205 0.185 
 pharmacy/drug vendor All -5514** 2388  -0.398*** 0.105 
  Poor -5245** 2347  -0.445*** 0.112 
  Non-Poor -5687** 2860  -0.355*** 0.131 
By distance to district hospital,          N=5606  
 ≤ 5km All -13820** 6854  -0.464*** 0.110 
  Poor -14616** 7358  -0.579*** 0.111 
  Non-Poor -11828* 7159  -0.395*** 0.138 
 > 5km All -2700 3746  -0.136 0.165 
  Poor -3155 4116  -0.169 0.185 
  Non-Poor -2129 4323  -0.101 0.189 
By years HEF has been in operation, N=5606 
 ≤ 1 year All -6397 4281  -0.266** 0.126 
  Poor -6391 4544  -0.293** 0.145 
  Non-Poor -5880 4821  -0.235 0.147 
 >1 year All -7956 4910  -0.331** 0.156 
  Poor -9132* 5218  -0.418** 0.171 
  Non-Poor -6679 5447  -0.267 0.178 
By implementer of HEF,                   N=5606       
 Government All -3533 4025  -0.195 0.207 
 NGO All -7096* 3960  -0.316** 0.123 
  Poor -7505* 4340  -0.368*** 0.135 
  Non-Poor -6408 4419  -0.271* 0.145 
By whether HEF operates,                N=5606 
 with contracting of public  All -7049 6357  -0.389** 0.178 
 health services Poor -8795 7143  -0.419** 0.193 
  Non-Poor -5530 8068  -0.264 0.280 
 without contracting out All -3263 4153  -0.161 0.156 
  Poor -6143 5153  -0.277* 0.165 
  Non-Poor -1557 4331  -0.071 0.183 
 
Notes: As Table 5. Effects by type of provider estimated from samples selected on whether that provider reported 
as usual source of care for any household member. Effects by distance to district hospital (DH) computed from 
model with three-way interaction between HEF indicator, poverty status and distance to DH. Effects by HEF 
vintage and government/NGO implementer computed from model like equation (8). Effects by co-existence with 
contracting estimated from a model including indicators for both HEF and contracting each fully interacted with 
each other and with the poverty indicator. In all cases, estimated effects on the probability of payments being 
positive are never significant. 
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Table 7: Effects of contracting of public health services on payments for health care 






















Notes: As Table 5. Effects by co-existence with HEF estimated from same model used for last panel of Table 6. 






  E[OOP|OOP>0] – GLM 
    Riel (3841 = $1) Relative effect 
    ATT2 SE RATT2 SE 
  All  -8710** 3933 -0.381*** 0.127 
  Poor  -3920 2933 -0.264 0.170 
  Non-poor  -14463*** 5575 -0.475*** 0.112 
By whether contracting operates      
 alongside HEF      
  All  -9405** 4569 -0.373*** 0.143 
  Poor  -2963 3388 -0.220 0.222 
  Non-poor  -14252** 6198 -0.468*** 0.124 
 without HEF      
  All  -2938 3822 -0.139 0.265 
  Poor  -340 3559 -0.029 0.307 
  Non-poor  -6022 5357 -0.328 0.252 
N    5606    
27  
 
Table 8: Effects of HEF on health-related debt and non-medical consumption by poverty status 
Health-related debt     
  Pr(debt>0)  E[debt|debt>0]  E[debt] 
  Logit  GLM  Robust GLM    
  ATT1 SE Baseline  ATT2 SE Baseline RATT2 SE  ATT2 RATT2 SE  ATT RATT 
 All -0.005 0.010 0.053  -52179 36218 207059 -0.252** 0.120  -56356 -0.276*** 0.113  -3938 -0.329 
 Poor -0.017 0.017 0.082  -52778* 28155 186162 -0.284** 0.119  -46200 -0.277*** 0.098  -6404 -0.444 
 Non-poor 0.006 0.008 0.027  -51012 68304 309034 -0.165 0.203  -75799 -0.275* 0.157     175   0.025 
 N 11027    665      665    11027  
   
Non-medical consumption  E[non-medical consumption] 
      GLM       
      ATT SE RATT SE         
 All     2142 3657 0.019 0.033         
 Poor     2501 2550 0.032 0.033         
 Non-poor     1144 5749 0.008 0.042         
 N     14359            
 
Notes: As for Table 5. Estimated from 2004, 2007, 2008 and 2009 CSES. Standard errors for the ATT2 derived from the robust GLM estimator have not been computed and those 
for the RATT2 from this estimator are not adjusted for clustering at the commune level. 
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Table 9: Effects of HEFs on sickness and health care utilisation by poverty status, 
gender and age 
      ATT1 SE Baseline 
Probability of having illness, injury or other health problem in last 4 weeks  
 All treated -0.020 0.017 0.177 
 Poor -0.017 0.019 0.185 
 Non poor -0.022 0.018 0.172 
 Female -0.026 0.020 0.215 
 Children -0.009 0.017 0.154 
 N   69604 
Probability of seeking health care if ill in last 4 weeks  
 All treated 0.003 0.032 0.860 
 Poor -0.007 0.040 0.842 
 Non poor 0.010 0.030 0.874 
 Female 0.004 0.033 0.860 
 Children 0.013 0.030 0.873 
 N    10741 
Probability of usually seeking care at public provider if ill and seek care  
 All treated 0.006 0.032 0.192 
 Poor -0.006 0.037 0.223 
 Non poor 0.015 0.032 0.168 
 Female -0.005 0.034 0.199 
 Children 0.016 0.036 0.203 
 N    8680 
Probability of usually seeking care at private clinic/ hospital if ill and seek care  
 All treated -0.078* 0.042 0.229 
 Poor -0.051 0.037 0.167 
 Non poor -0.096* 0.049 0.273 
 Female -0.092** 0.045 0.253 
 Children -0.067* 0.040 0.187 
 N    7959 
Probability of usually seeking care at private pharmacy / drug vendor if ill and seek care 
 All treated 0.046 0.050 0.361 
 Poor 0.054 0.054 0.369 
 Non Poor 0.040 0.052 0.356 
 Female 0.067 0.050 0.338 
 Children 0.026 0.054 0.390 
  N   8388 
 
Notes: Estimated from CSES 2004, 2007, 2008 and 2009. Observations are individuals. ATT1 estimated 
from dummy variable logit models as in equation (2). All models control for covariates listed in Table 4 
plus commune fixed effects, month effects, year effects and wealth quintile effects with the latter two 
interacted. For adults, the individual’s own education, economic activity and occupation is used rather than 
that of the head of household. In addition, demographics are controlled for through indicators for 18 age-
sex categories. Standard errors (SE) are corrected for clustering at the commune level. Baseline is the 
counterfactual probability. Sample sizes differ due to dropping communes for which there is no within 





Table A1: Household characteristics used in principal components analysis 
 construction of wealth index with means and factor weightings in 2004 
    Mean  Factor 
weighting 
Primary construction material of the roof of the housing/dwelling unit occupied by the household is  
 Thatch     0.208 -0.185 
 Tiles     0.268 0.047 
 Fibrous cement     0.051 0.061 
 Galvanized iron     0.352 0.032 
 Salvaged materials    0.002 0.003 
 Mixed but mainly made of galvanized iron/aluminum, tiles or fibrous cement 0.011 0.003 
 Mixed but mainly made of thatch/leave /grass or salvaged materials 0.005 -0.025 
 Concrete     0.042 0.237 
 Other     0.062 -0.085 
Primary construction material of the wall of the housing/dwelling unit occupied by the household is 
 Bamboo, thatch    0.271 -0.179 
 Wood or logs     0.252 0.041 
 Plywood     0.197 0.032 
 Concrete, brick, stone     0.093 0.314 
 Galvanized iron     0.022 -0.001 
 Fibrous cement    0.002 -0.002 
 Makeshift, salvaged     0.014 -0.021 
 Other     0.150 -0.110 
Floor area of the housing (m2)    43.013 0.265 
Area of the plot used for vegetable gardening, agricultural or farming (m2)  21.60 -0.004 
Percentage of household members economically inactive (%)  0.416 0.039 
Durable goods per household, number of  
 radio     0.379 0.092 
 television     0.496 0.295 
 cell phones     0.201 0.372 
 videos     0.069 0.260 
 stereo     0.238 0.225 
 camera (picture/video)     0.030 0.213 
 bicycle     0.847 0.057 
 motorcycle     0.350 0.322 
  cart     0.251 -0.075 
  car     0.033 0.267 
  jeep     0.007 0.095 
  rowing boat     0.085 -0.034 
  motor boat     0.024 0.007 
  tractor     0.003 0.008 
  hand tractor     0.042 -0.007 
Purchase value of all means of transportation/vehicle (current Riel prices) 1410381 0.285 
Livestock per household, number of  
 Cattle    1.140 -0.068 
 Buffaloes    1.041 -0.004 
 Horses, Ponies    0.009 -0.011 
 Pigs    0.913 -0.005 
 Goats    0.019 -0.003 
 
Notes: PCA is conducted separately for each year. Means and factors weightings shown for 2004 only. 
 
